The Introduction of the Euro and Its Implications for Obligations Denominated In Currencies Replaced by the Euro by Gruson, Michael
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 21, Issue 1 1997 Article 5
The Introduction of the Euro and Its
Implications for Obligations Denominated In
Currencies Replaced by the Euro
Michael Gruson∗
∗
Copyright c©1997 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Introduction of the Euro and Its
Implications for Obligations Denominated In
Currencies Replaced by the Euro
Michael Gruson
Abstract
This Article will discuss to what extent fears that debt in a country’s national currency will
no longer be enforceable under U.S. law after the introduction of the Euro are justified. The ar-
ticle assumes that the European Council, as provided for in the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (”EC Treaty”) and the European Commission’s European Council Regulation, will es-
tablish a fixed rate of conversion for the old national currencies of all participating Member States
in relation to the Euro. The subject of our inquiry, thus, is whether, following the introduction of
the single currency, U.S. courts will acknowledge the abolition of the old national currencies and
apply the above-mentioned Council Regulations and relevant legislation of participating Member
States, in suits for payment on obligations denominated in these abolished currencies.
ARTICLE
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OBLIGATIONS
DENOMINATED IN CURRENCIES
REPLACED BY THE EURO
Michael Gruson *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................... 66
I. Suits for Payment in U.S. Dollars ................... 68
A. Availability of U.S. Dollar Judgments ........... 68
B. Currency Conversion Date Before the End of
the Transitional Period ......................... 69
C. Currency Conversion Date After the End of the
Transitional Period ............................. 71
II. Suits for Payment in an Old National Currency or
in E u ro ............................................. 72
A. Judgments in Foreign Currencies .............. 72
B. Obligations Governed by the Law of the
Country of the Foreign Currency .............. 73
C. Obligations Governed by New York Law ....... 77
1. Application of the Lex Monetae ............. 78
2. The Act of State Doctrine .................. 80
3. Public Policy ............................... 83
D. Application of U.C.C. Section 2-614(2) ......... 86
E. Contract Interpretation ........................ 87
1. Interpretation .............................. 87
2. O m itted Case .............................. 89
3. Impossibility and Impracticability of
Perform ance ............................... 90
4. Frustration of Contract ..................... 93
III. Consequences for ECU Obligations ................ 95
* Partner, Shearman & Sterling; Law School, University of Mainz, Germany, 1962;
M.C.L. 1963, L.L.B. 1965, Columbia University; Dr.jur. (1966), Freie Universitat Berlin.
The author would like to thank Dr. Tim Brandi for his assistance in preparing this
Article.
66 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:65
IV. Clauses in New Contracts .......................... 98
V. New York Statute on the Euro ..................... 100
C onclusion ................................................ 107
INTRODUCTION
Some authors have expressed concern that long-term pay-
ment obligations, notably bonds,' denominated in the national
currency of a Member State of the European Union ("EU") par-
ticipating in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary
Union 2 ("EMU"), will no longer be enforceable in U.S. courts
after the introduction of the Euro.3 For instance, an ECU Bank-
ing Association working group concluded in its final report that
New York courts' precedents regarding the enforceability of for-
eign currency debt obligations in the event of a fundamental
change in the nature of the currency are uncertain.4 The Euro-
pean Mortgage Federation also expressed concern that after the
introduction of the single European currency, payment obliga-
tions denominated in old national currencies may be considered
invalid in non-European countries, in particular the United
1. This Article will not address the special problems that may arise in connection
with liabilities under derivative financial instruments.
2. The summit meeting of heads of state and government of the European Com-
mission's ("EC") Member States, which took place at Maastricht on December 9 and 10,
1991, ended with a historic agreement on a new Treaty on European Union (the "Maas-
tricht Treaty"), dated February 7, 1992, and effective January 1, 1993, which incorpo-
rated into the Treaty Establishing the European Community (the Treaty of Rome) pro-
visions relating to the Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU") and political union and
establishing the European Community. Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made
by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973, Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I), as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l
Pub. Off. 1987). The first stage of the EMU began on July 1, 1990. Pursuant to Article
109e(1) of the EC Treaty, the second stage for achieving EMU began on January 1,
1994. EC Treaty, supra, Art. 109e(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 647. In the second stage the
Member States are to endeavor to avoid excessive government deficits, and to start the
process leading to the independence of their central banks. Id. Art. 109e(4)-(5),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 648. If, by the end of 1997 the date for the beginning of the third
stage of EMU has not been set, the third stage shall start on January 1, 1999. Id. Art.
109j(4), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 653.
3. The national currencies of Member States participating in the third stage of the
EMU are referred to herein as "old national currencies."
4. See ECU Banking Association, LegalAspects of the Transition to the Single Currency, 7
DE PECUNIA 33, 46 (1995).
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States and Japan.5
This Article will discuss to what extent such fears are justi-
fied under U.S. law. It assumes that the European Council, as
provided for in the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity6 ("EC Treaty") and the European Commission's European
Council Regulation,7 will establish a fixed rate of conversion for
the old national currencies of all participating Member States in
relation to the Euro.8 The subject of our inquiry, thus, is
whether, following the introduction of the single currency, U.S.
courts' will acknowledge the abolition of the old national cur-
5. See "European Report," published by "Europe Information Service" (October
28, 1995). See also Fischer & Klanten, Langfristige Bankvertrige und die Euro-Wihrung, 8
ZEITSCHRIWT FUR BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFr 1, 7 (1996); Cunningham, Jones &
Hogan, Economic and Monetary Union and Continuity of Contract Under New York
Law (April 10, 1997) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
6. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 1091(4), 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 655, 716.
7. See Commission of the European Communities, COM (96) 499 Final (Oct. 16,
1996) (providing secondary legislation for introduction of Euro and some provisions
relating to introduction of Euro) [hereinafter Council Document COM (96) 499].
This Communication contains two proposals for regulations, "Proposal for a Council
Regulation (EC) on some provisions relating to the introduction of the euro" (docu-
ment 96/0249(CNS)) and "Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the introduc-
tion of the euro" (document 96/0250(CNS)), each of which contains draft regulations
and an explanatory memorandum. The necessity for two separate regulations results
from the fact that the third sentence of Article 1091(4) of the EC Treaty, pursuant to
which the European Council has authority to take all "other measures necessary for the
rapid introduction of . . . the single currency," will not be available as a legal basis
before 1998, when, pursuant to Article 109j (4) of the EC Treaty, it will have been de-
cided which Member States fulfill the necessary conditions for the introduction of the
single currency. Regulations for which there exists an urgent need for legal certainty
may be enacted in reliance on Article 235 of the EC Treaty. The proposed Council
Regulation on the introduction of the euro ("Article 109j (4) Council Regulation") will
be promulgated on the basis of Article 109j(4) of the EC Treaty. See O.J.C. 236/7
(1997) (containing draft of Article 109j (4) Council Regulation as approved by the Eu-
ropean Council on July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation]. The
Council Regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro ("Ar-
ticle 235 Council Regulation") has been promulgated on the basis of Article 235. Coun-
cil Regulation No. 1103/97, O.J.L 162/1 (1997) [hereinafter Art. 235 Council Regula-
tion].
For a summary of the contents of both proposed Regulations, see Schefold, Die
Europaischen Verordnungen iiber die Einfiihrung des Euro, 50 Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und
Bankrecht, WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN 1 (Supp. 4 1996); v. Borries & Repplinger-Hach,
Auf dem Weg zur "Euro-Verordnung", 49 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRlFr 3111 (1996).
8. See Art. 235 Council Regulation, supra note 7, art. 4; Art. 109j(4) Council Regu-
lation, supra note 7, art. 3.
9. This Article primarily addresses the law of the State of New York. It can be
assumed that, with regard to the issues discussed herein, the laws of the other states of
the United States will not differ significantly from the law of New York. Under the Erie
doctrine, the U.S. federal courts apply both the substantive law of the state in which the
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rencies and apply the above-mentioned Council Regulations and
relevant legislation of participating Member States, in suits for
payment on obligations denominated in these abolished curren-
cies.
Following the abolition of the old national currencies, this
question could arise in three different contexts, depending on
the currency in which the judgment of the U.S. court is sought:
(1) When sued for payment in U.S. dollars, a debtor
could claim that its obligation to pay has become worthless,
because the old national currency in which the obligation is
denominated no longer has any value in relation to the U.S.
dollar.
(2) When sued for payment in an old national currency, a
debtor could claim that the fulfillment of its obligation is le-
gally impossible because of the abolition of the currency in
which the obligation was denominated.
(3) In a suit for payment in Euro, the creditor would
have to prove that under U.S. law the old national currency
has been validly replaced by the Euro and that ajudgment in
Euro, calculated by means of the fixed legal rate of exchange
for the old national currency, is equivalent for purposes of
U.S. law to a hypothetical judgment in the old national cur-
rency. The debtor could claim that he or she was contractually
obligated to pay in the old national currency only.
I. SUITS FOR PAYMENT IN U.S. DOLLARS
A. Availability of U.S. Dollar Judgments
U.S. courts'judgments are ordinarily in U.S. dollars even on
causes of action denominated in a foreign currency.'" Thus,
judgments in U.S. dollars are always available even though the
obligation being enforced is denominated in a foreign currency.
In order to translate the value of such a foreign currency obliga-
tion into U.S. dollars, the court must determine the appropriate
date for establishing the rate of exchange between the foreign
court is located (Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) and the conflict-of-
laws rules of that state (Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electrical Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941);Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 1971))
when their subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity (28 U.S.C.A. § 1332).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 823 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. See N.Y. U.C.C.
LAw § 3-107 (McKinney 1991).
[Vol. 21:65
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currency and the U.S. dollar." According to the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, if a court gives ajudgment in U.S. dollars
in a case arising out of a foreign currency obligation, the cur-
rency conversion is to be made at such a rate as to make the
creditor whole and to avoid rewarding the debtor who has
delayed in carrying out the obligation.' 2 Pursuant to the so-
called "New York Rule," followed by the New York courts, most
other state courts, and, under certain circumstances, federal
courts, 3 courts will determine the conversion rate of an obliga-
tion to pay a sum of money as of the date of breach of the con-
tract. 4 Federal courts, however, when deciding federal law is-
sues, 15 often employ the rate of exchange on the date of judg-
ment.
16
B. Currency Conversion Date Before the End of the
Transitional Period
If the date of the breach of an obligation or the judgment
date occurs before the end of the transitional period, while both
the Euro and the old national currencies remain in circulation,' 7
courts will not be faced with the problem of converting an obso-
lete, old national currency into U.S. dollars. Courts still must,
however, determine the appropriate exchange rate between the
11. See Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1537 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (noting
U.S. Supreme Court's position on this matter), aff'd, 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
12. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 10, § 823(2). See also id.,
cmt. d (noting that court may, in interests of justice, refer to (late at which obligation
first became due, date when judgment was rendered, or date when judgment is paid or
enforced).
13. In cases in which subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity, U.S. courts
apply the New York rule. See supra note 9 (discussing Erie doctrine and subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal courts based on diversity of parties); see also RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823, Reporters' Note no. 2 (citing further
authority).
14. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823, cmt. d; Dough-
erty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 193 N.E. 897 (N.Y. 1934).
15. In such situations, these courts are exercising "federal jurisdiction;" see, e.g., 28
U.S.C.A. § 1331.
16. The precedent of the federal courts is far from unanimous. See RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823, Reporters' Note no. 2 (citing further
authority).
17. See Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, arts. 5-9. See also
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Finanznachrichten Nr. 43/95, Dec. 19, 1995 (stating
conclusions concerning EMU by chair of European Council held in Madrid on Decem-
ber 15/16, 1995).
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old national currency and the dollar."8 Two alternatives for de-
termining this exchange rate are available to U.S. courts, which
can lead to different results:
(1) the courts could use the exchange rate between the old
national currency and the U.S. dollar quoted in Europe,
which, owing to the irrevocably fixed rate of exchange
between the old national currency and the Euro, will be
economically equivalent to using the Euro-U.S. dollar
exchange rate, or
(2) the courts could use the exchange rate between the old
national currency and the U.S. dollar quoted in New
York, which, even though the old national currency will
be simply a different expression of the Euro during the
transitional period,19 will not necessarily be economi-
cally equivalent to using the Euro-U.S. dollar exchange
rate quoted in New York.
Normally, U.S. courts use the rate of exchange prevailing in
the forum state or an important financial center, for example
New York, for the conversion of a foreign currency obligation
into U.S. dollars. 20 Courts may look to the official rate for U.S.
dollars existing in the country of issue of the foreign currency
only when there was no market for the currency in question in
the United States on the applicable date.21 It is possible that a
direct exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and old national
currencies will be ascertainable during the transitional period
and that exchange rates for the old national currencies in New
York will not be linked to the Euro exchange rates fixed by law
18. In the transitional period between January 1, 1999 and January 1, 2002, the
Euro and the old national currencies of participating Member States will circulate one
alongside the other, while the European Council will on January 1, 1999 have estab-
lished an irrevocable exchange rate between the Euro and the participating currencies.
The old national currency will simply be another form of expression for the Euro which
will be the single and sole currency. See U.H. Schneider, Die Vereinbarung und die Erfil-
lung von Geldschulden in Euro, 49 DER BETRIEB 2477, 2478 (1996); Schefold, supra note 7,
at 11. See also Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper of the Euro-
pean Commission on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of the Single
Currency, COM (95) 333 Final (May 31, 1995).
19. See Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, Recitals 8 and 13 and art. 6;
comments on art. 6 of the art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, contained in
Council Document COM (96) 499, supra note 7.
20. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823, Reporters'
Note no. 5.
21. Id.
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in Europe.22 U.S. courts would probably use this New York mar-
ket rate to calculate a judgement amount because this rate
would be a market rate reflecting the true value23 of the old na-
tional currency, in contrast to the artificial rate set by the Euro-
pean Council for the exchange of the old national currency to
the Euro. According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law, the court must also ensure that the parties are neither pre-
ferred nor prejudiced in any way by the currency conversion.24
C. Currency Conversion Date After the End of the Transitional Period
Should the breach date or the judgment date occur after
the transitional period ends, the issue arises as to what signifi-
cance a court would attach to the final abolition of the old na-
tional currency when valuing the obligation in U.S. dollars.
If the court recognizes the abolition of the old national cur-
rency and the introduction of the Euro, then it also will have to
take account of the old national currency-Euro exchange rate set
by the European Council. In this case, the court could calculate
the U.S. dollar value of the obligation on the basis of the ex-
change rate between the U.S. dollar and the relevant amount in
Euro.
If the court does not recognize the currency transition, how-
ever, the U.S. dollar value of the obligation must be based on the
old national currency. As the old national currency will already
have been abolished, the currency itself will no longer be traded
on the currency markets. Even so, securities denominated in the
old national currencies could still be traded on the securities
markets.25 In this event, the nominal value of the securities
would be calculated on the basis of the legal exchange rate be-
tween the old national currency and the Euro, for which an ex-
change rate to the U.S. dollar would exist on the market.
22. A discrepancy of this kind will arise when foreign currency traders do not be-
lieve that the EMU will last.
23. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 754 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir.
1985). See Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1538 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (court
applied black market exchange rate because evidence showed that no individual could
really trade at official rate).
24. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823(2), cmt. c.
25. In determining the relevant exchange rate, a U.S. court is not limited to the
U.S. market. See Vishipco Line, 754 F.2d at 456-57 (encouraging district court, in deter-
mining the relevant exchange rate for Vietnamese currency, "to pursue an innovative
approach.").
19971
72 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
Through this circuitous means, the U.S. court could determine a
U.S. dollar value for any obligations denominated in an old na-
tional currency. Furthermore, it will be theoretically possible,
even after the end of the transitional period, to extrapolate from
the market value of a security denominated in an old national
currency the factor which reflects the market value of the old
national currency. This market value could be different from
the official old national currency-Euro exchange rate.
Thus, in a suit for payment in U.S. dollars, it will not matter
whether or not the courts recognize the abolition of the old na-
tional currency. In either case, the court could determine the
U.S. dollar value of the obligation expressed in the old national
currency.
II. SUITS FOR PAYMENT IN AN OLD NATIONAL CURRENCY
OR IN EURO
A. Judgments in Foreign Currencies
The traditional U.S. rule has been that U.S. courts are re-
quired to render money judgments payable in U.S. dollars only,
even if the currency of the obligation is a foreign currency. 6
This legal principle, however, no longer enjoys unconditional ac-
ceptance in the U.S. courts. 27 In several states, for example New
York,25 the entry of judgments in foreign currency has since
been authorized by legislation. However, a judgment in a for-
eign currency should be issued only when requested by the judg-
ment creditor.2 9
The legal analysis necessary to answer the question of
whether a U.S. court will recognize the currency laws of a coun-
try which has abolished the stipulated contractual currency in
favor of a new currency depends on whether the contracting par-
ties have chosen the law of the country in whose currency the
26. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823, cmt. b, Report-
ers' Note no. 1.
27. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823, cmt. b.
28. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 27 (McKinney Supp. 1997); U.C.C. § 3-107(2) (1995) (stating
that, if instrument specifies foreign currency as medium of payment, such instrument is
payable in that currency). New York deleted this clause when adopting the U.C.C. As
to other states, see Peter Hay, Fremdwdhrungsanspriiche und-urteile nach den US-amerikanis-
chen Uniforn Act, 49 Zeitschrift fir Wirtschafts-und Bankrecht WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN
113 (1995).
29. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 10, § 823, cmt. b.
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obligation is denominated or New York law to govern their
agreement.
B. Obligations Governed by the Law of the Country of the
Foreign Currency
If the parties to an agreement elect to have their contract
governed by the law of a foreign country, such choice of law will
be recognized under New York law as long as the transaction
bears a "reasonable relationship" ° to the law chosen or, more
precisely stated, to the jurisdiction whose law has been chosen.
Generally, an obligation denominated in a foreign currency will
have a reasonable relationship to the country of that currency.
3 1
A valid governing law clause stipulating a foreign law effectively
precludes the application of New York law to the contract, not
only New York's facultative, but also its mandatory provisions. 2
The choice of law prevails as long as it does not conflict with an
important public policy of New York or, under certain condi-
tions, of another state or country.33 There are very few New York
cases in which the court has restricted the application of an
otherwise valid choice of a foreign law clause on account of a
30. See Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements-New York's Ap-
proach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323 (1979) [hereinafter Gruson, Governing Law
Clauses]; Gruson, Rechtswahlklauseln in Handelsvertragen in New York, 29 RECHT DER IN-
TERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 393 (1983); SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 669-74 (2d.
ed., 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws]; N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 1-105 (McKinney 1993). Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws Section 187(2)(a) requires that the state of the chosen law
have a substantial connection to the transaction. According to Scoles & Hay, supra, at
673, the substantial test is no stricter than the reasonable test developed by case law.
31. But see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Company, [1989] 1 QB 728.
If, as the court found in that case, which did not involve choice of law, dollar transac-
tions are not necessarily cleared in New York, the mere fact that the contract currency is
the currency of the country of the stipulated law, arguably does not by itself establish a
reasonable relation between the transaction and the country of the currency.
32. See Gruson, The Act of State Doctrine in Contract Cases as a Conflict-of-Laws Rule,
1988:2 U. ILL. L. REv. 519, 521-22 (1988) [hereinafter Gruson, Act of State Doctrine];
Gruson; Legal Opinions of New York Counsel in International Transactions, 1989 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 365, 372 (1989) [hereinafter Gruson, Legal Opinions]; RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, § 187(2), cmts. d, e.
33. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 30, § 187(2) (b). As to public
policy of the forum, see Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in International and Interstate Loan
Agreements-New York's Approach, 1982:1 U. ILL. L. Rrv. 207, 220-22 (1982) [hereinafter
Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in Loan Agreements]; Gruson, Governing Law Clauses, supra
note 30, at 374-78; as to public policy of third countries, see Gruson, Act of State Doctrine,
supra note 32, at 522-24.
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conflicting public policy of New York or another jurisdiction.34
It is difficult to conceive of a New York public policy that would
be offended by application of the laws governing the introduc-
tion of the Euro.
If the parties to a contract selected as governing law the law
of the country of the contract currency, a court would treat the
country's laws governing such currency as part of the law gov-
erning the contract.35 Thus, the law of the chosen European
country would be applied along with the monetary laws of the
chosen country, including the regulations governing the replace-
ment of the old national currency with the Euro.
The New York State Court of Appeals reached this conclu-
sion in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States.36 In Dougherty, the Court considered the validity of obliga-
tions to pay under Russian insurance policies entered into by the
insured prior to 1918, which were subsequently declared null
and void by Soviet legislation in 1919."7 One of the questions
raised concerned the effect upon these obligations of the intro-
duction of a new currency. The insurance contracts provided
for payment in the old czarist ruble, which was the currency in
Russia at the time the contracts were signed. During the period
from 1919 to 1924, the Soviet government repeatedly issued de-
crees in which a new legal tender was introduced.3" After 1924,
the "Chervonetz gold rubles" and state treasury notes became
the only legal tender in the Soviet Union.
The parties had agreed on Russian law.39 The Court held
that Russian law should govern the contracts, as they were de-
34. See Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 522, 524 (providing examples
of cases in which New York courts have restricted application of otherwise valid choice
of foreign law clause on account of conflicting public policy); Gruson, Legal Opinions,
supra note 32, at 375-76, 381 (providing further examples of cases in which New York
courts, on public policy grounds, have restricted application of foreign law provisions).
35. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 30, § 206 ("Issues relating to
details of performance of a contract are determined by the local law of the place of
performance.").
36. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 193 N.E. 897
(N.Y. 1934). In Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank the court reached the same result although
in that case the law governing the contract at issue (Russian law) was determined by way
of the objective connections test (Tubel bank account with a Russian bank in Petro-
grad). Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1931).
37. Dougherty, 193 N.E. at 900.
38. Id. at 904-06.
39. Id. at 898-99.
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nominated in rubles, had been entered into between Russian cit-
izens, and were to be performed in Russia.4" Because the insur-
ance contracts had been declared null and void in Russia by leg-
islation, the court held that the plaintiffs had no further rights
under the policies pursuant to Russian law.41 The Court further
held that New York public policy was not offended by the appli-
cation of Russian law.42 The Court argued in dicta that the
plaintiffs would not have had any further claims under these in-
surance contracts even if the contracts had not been declared
null and void, because the contractual currency, czarist Russian
rubles, was now worthless under Russian law.43 The Soviet gov-
ernment had not set a rate of exchange for pre-revolutionary
obligations when making the transition to the Chervonetz gold
ruble.44 Thus, the Court took the position that the whole Soviet
law, including its monetary laws, governed the contract.45
When the disputed contract does not contain a choice of
law clause, modern U.S. conflict-of-laws rules require the court
to determine the effect of a currency substitution by evaluating
the contract's objective connections to the relevant jurisdictions.
In particular, the New York State Court of Appeals applies the
"center of gravity test" or the "grouping of contacts test."46
Under these tests, a court would apply the law of the state which
has the most significant relationship to, or contacts with, the
matter in dispute.4 7 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
40. Id. The Court revealed in dicta that it continued to apply the "vested rights"
theory of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) and did not necessarily give
effect to the choice of law clause. Today, a court would apply the criteria of objective
connections only if the parties had not agreed to subject their agreement to the laws of
any specific jurisdiction.
41. Id. at 900-01, 903.
42. Id. at 903.
43. Id at 903-07.
44. Id. at 906-07.
45. The Dougherty case would today be decided on the basis of the act of state
doctrine, through which the court would nevertheless have come to the same result,
because it would have located the situs of the contracts in the Soviet Union. See infta
notes 81-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the situs concept.
46. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954); Gruson, Act of State Doctrine,
supra note 32, at 525; Gruson, Governing Law Clauses, supra note 30, at 327.
47. See Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 101-02; Index Fund, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
580 F.2d 1158, 1162 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979);Johansen v. Con-
federation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83,
90 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 525. The
points of connections or "contacts" to be considered are listed in Section 188(2) of the
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Laws also follows this approach.4" Other courts apply, instead,
the "governmental interest analysis."49 Under this theory, the
court applies the law of the state or country that has the "great-
est" or "dominant" interest in regulating the disputed issue.5 0
In Johansen v. Confederation Life Association,5 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit unequivocally treated a Cuban
currency law as an integral component of the laws governing the
contract at issue. The Court applied the U.S. conflict-of-laws
principles described above 5 2 in a case presenting issues compara-
ble to those raised in this Article. In Johansen, the plaintiffs de-
manded payment on life insurance policies that had been issued
in 1937, 1939, and 1946 by the Cuban branch of the defendant
Canadian insurance company. The contracts did not contain a
governing law clause, but all three contracts named Havana as
the place of payment. The contracts also contained a clause pro-
viding that amounts payable under the contracts should be paid
in the "lawful currency of the United States of America. '"" At
the time of signing of the contract, both the U.S. dollar and the
Cuban peso were lawful currency in Cuba. In 1951, the Cuban
Government enacted a law under which the U.S. dollar was no
longer to be lawful currency in Cuba and all obligations denomi-
nated in this currency were to be settled in Cuban pesos. The
plaintiffs nevertheless demanded their insurance payments in
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra
note 30, § 188(2).
48. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, §§ 188-89; Gruson, Act of
State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 523.
49. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); SCOLES & HAY, supra note
30, at 688-90.
50. See, e.g., Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576
(N.Y. 1969);Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1971).
See also Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 525; Gruson, Governing Law
Clauses, supra note 30, at 329.
51. Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971). A similar
fact pattern was presented to the court in Confederation Life Ass'n. v. Ugalde, 164 So.2d 1
(Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964).
52. The Court of Appeals confirmed the interpretation of the lower court, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had determined the law
governing the contract in accordance with the "center of gravity" or "grouping of con-
tacts" test. The criteria that led to the application of Cuban law included: the place
where the contract was concluded, the residence of the plaintiff at the time of the
contract was concluded, the payment of premiums in Cuba, the maintenance of
reserves on account of the plaintiff by the insurance company in Cuba, and mainte-
nance of the insurance policies in Cuba. SeeJohansen, 447 F.2d at 178-80.
53. Id. at 177.
[Vol. 21:65
INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO
U.S. dollars. The Court interpreted the currency clause cited
above as requiring payment in the lawful currency of Cuba at the
time of payment.54
The Court decided that both the "grouping of contacts test"
and the "governmental interest analysis" required application of
Cuban law and, therefore, of the 1951 currency law, to the insur-
ance contracts. Thus, the Court dismissed the complaint, hold-
ing that the defendants were prohibited from making payments
under the insurance contracts in U.S. dollars and that the con-
tracts should be converted from "dollar contracts" into "peso
contracts."5 It is possible, however, that the Second Circuit
might have disregarded the Cuban currency law and allowed the
complaint if a law other than Cuban law had governed the con-
tracts.
In light of these decisions, a U.S. court would probably re-
gard the EU regulations governing the introduction of the Euro
as part of the law of the contract in the three fact patterns
presented under the Introduction above if the contract were
governed by the law of a participating EU Member State.
C. Obligations Governed by New York Law
A choice of law clause, in which the parties elect New York
law, generally precludes the application of all other law.5 6
Under New York law, a "reasonable relationship" need not exist
between the State of New York and the transaction. 57 The laws
of a jurisdiction other than the chosen New York law may be
applicable despite a valid choice of law clause, however, with re-
spect to issues of corporate law relating to a foreign corporate
party to the agreement,5" the consequences of a foreign bank-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 180-81.
56. See Gruson, Governing Law Clauses, supra note 30, at 362-70; Gruson, Legal Opin-
ions, supra note 32, at 372; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, § 187,
cmts. c-e.
57. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989) (providing that in cases of
choice of New York law, reasonable relationship between transaction and New York is
unnecessary when transaction volume exceeds US$250,000 and certain other condi-
tions are met). The reason for this rule is to allow parties to take advantage of the
highly developed commercial law of the State of New York in arranging their business
transactions. Further, this rule helps to reinforce New York's role as an international
financial center. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 30, at 670-71.
58. See Gruson, Governing Law Clauses, supra note 30, at 365-66; Gruson, Governing-
Law Clauses in Loan Agreements, supra note 33, at 223-24.
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ruptcy,5 1 the act of state doctrine,6" and in the case of a conflict-
ing principle of public policy of ajurisdiction other than the one
chosen by the parties.6 The question is whether there is a fur-
ther exception to choice of law clauses under New York law that
allows New York courts to apply the currency or monetary laws of
the country in whose currency an obligation is denominated,
even though New York law governs the obligation. This rule is
frequently referred to as the lex monetae, i.e. law of the money.
1. Application of the Lex Monetae
According to several authors,6 2 the U.S. courts recognize
the conflict-of-laws principle applied in many other jurisdic-
tions,63 namely that each sovereign state possesses exclusive com-
petence to decide what constitutes legal tender within its terri-
tory. The recognition of a currency as legal tender for a given
state, as well as the determination of that currency's nominal
value, would thus, under U.S. conflict-of-laws rules, be deter-
mined by the "law of the money" (lex monetae), i.e., by the law of
the state that issued the currency in question as legal tender.
Under this view, the "law of the money" would govern regardless
of which substantive law applied to the contract as a result of the
parties' choice of law or its objective connections to a country.64
Each country would have exclusive authority to replace its lawful
currency with a new currency and to fix the conversion rate for
the old currency in relation to the new.65 The abolition of a
currency would lead only to the extinction of that currency and
59. See Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883); Gruson, Act
of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 558-60.
60. See Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 529-38; RESTATEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 443. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the act of state doctrine.
61. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, § 187(2). See infra
notes 89-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of public policy.
62. F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY, 266-79 (5th ed. 1992); NUSSBAUM,
MONEY IN THE LAw NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, 353-59 (1950); see also WOOD, COM-
PARATIVE FINANCIAL LAw 15-11, at 177 (1995).
63. See MANN, supra note 62, at 271-79. In Germany, the law governing a currency
in connection with international contracts is determined by the law of the state in
whose currency the debt is denominated. See Martiny in MONCHENER KOMMENTAR,
B(JRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) (2d ed., 1990), nach Art. 34 Einffuhrungsgesetz
zum Bfirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Introductory Act to the Civil Code), Anhang I, margin
note 5.
64. See MANN, supra note 62, at 267.
65. Id. at 267, 272.
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would not extinguish payment obligations denominated in the
old currency. The establishment of a rate of conversion by the
country of the currency would serve to safeguard the continuity
of the obligation as an obligation in the new currency. 66
The United States recognizes the view that the lex monetae is
based in part on the New York State Court of Appeals decision in
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.67 In
Dougherty, however, the New York State Court of Appeals only
applied an exchange rate fixed by the Soviet Government, (or
rather recognized the failure to fix an exchange rate) because
the contract was governed by Russian law. Thus, the New York
State Court of Appeals regarded the determination of the appro-
priate exchange rate as a question governed by the law of the
contract, not by the "law of the money." It is thus entirely possi-
ble that the Court would have reached a different result had the
insurance contract in question been governed by the law of an-
other state, such as New York.6" As a result, Dougherty does not
support the strict separation between the law of the contract and
the "law of the money" made by the authors referenced above.69
In Trinh v. Citibank, N.A.,7 the District Court applied
Vietnamese currency law and converted an old Vietnamese cur-
rency into the new Vietnamese currency by means of the official
conversion rate.7 ' Trinh, however, was also a case in which the
contract was governed by Vietnamese law.72
66. See id. at 266-68, 271-79.
67. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 192 N.E. 897
(N.Y. 1934). This opinion is cited by F.A. Mann in support for the view that the lex
monetae represents U.S. law. MANN, supra note 62, at 275 n.9.
68. Today, if the situs of the contracts had been located in Russia, a court, applying
the act of state doctrine, probably would have recognized the currency laws or the laws
that had declared the insurance contract void, even if the parties had chosen to be
subject to New York law. If the court had found the situs of the contract in New York, it
would not have recognized the currency laws as foreign acts of state. See infra notes 81-
86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sitms rules.
69. See MANN, supra note 62, at 272 n.3 (stating that lex monetae applies irrespective
of whether law of obligation in question is identical to or different from law of currency
in question). There is no support for this statement in U.S. case law.
70. Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985), affd, 850 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 1536-38. This case is also cited my Mann, supra note 62, at 267 n. 44 in
support of the proposition that U.S. courts apply the lex monetae.
72. Trinh, 623 F. Supp. at 1531; Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1167. The bank deposit agree-
ments in Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank were governed by Russian law under the objective
connections test. Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1931). Although
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It must be concluded that no U.S. court and no New York
State court has had the opportunity to decide whether it would
apply the national law of a foreign currency to an agreement
governed by the law of a state of the United States but denomi-
nated in such foreign currency. This is not to say that a court in
the United States should not apply the lex monetae in such a
case.
73
2. The Act of State Doctrine
Under the act of state doctrine, courts may apply the Euro-
pean currency legislation to contracts governed by New York law.
The act of state doctrine is a conflict-of-laws principle developed
in the U.S. jurisprudence of the 1970s and 1980s, which was used
to determine the effects of foreign sovereign acts, notably expro-
priations, in the United States.74 The act of state doctrine holds
that U.S. courts shall not examine the legality of acts of a foreign
country done within that country's own territory.75 Rather, in
deciding cases, the U.S. courts should regard these sovereign
measures as valid and applicable.76 Since the early 1980s, U.S.
courts have extended the act of state doctrine to cases in which a
the court did not discuss this issue of governing law in Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v.
Humphrey, the agreement relating to a German currency demand deposit by a U.S. citi-
zen with the Nirnberg branch of Deutsche Bank would be governed by German law
under the objective connections test. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey,
272 U.S. 517 (1926). This case only addressed the value of the claim, computed by
translation into dollars on the judgment date, not the issue of the replacement of the
contractual one by a new currency. Russian law must also have governed the rubel
checking account of plaintiff in the Vladivostok branch of a Russian bank in Klochkov v.
Petrogradski Medunarodni Commercheski Bank. Klochkov v. Petrogradski Mejdunarodni
Commercheski Bank, 268 N.Y.S. 433 (App. Div. 1934).
73. Some courts have applied lex monetae not as a principle of conflict of laws, but
as a matter of contract law as a result of an interpretation ascertaining the understand-
ing of the parties. See infra text accompanying notes 119-23 for a further discussion of
this issue.
74. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 443, cmts. a-d;
Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 529-38.
75. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 10, § 443.
76. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 443, cmt. d. In Mar-
tinez v. Crown Life Insurance Co., the court held that the Cuban currency law, as an act of
state, must be recognized by a U.S. court. Martinez v. Crown Life Insurance Co., 136
S.E.2d 912, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964). Where the act of state doctrine is applied to
contracts, the issue is one of applicable law: does the law of the contract or the act of
state determine the issue in question? The issue is really no longer whether the court
should inquire into the validity of the act of a foreign state under the law of the forum.
Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 560.
INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO
sovereign act modifies the contractual relations between foreign
and U.S. parties.77
The act of state doctrine as a conflict-of-laws principle helps
to explain why U.S. courts must respect the sovereign acts of a
country other than the one whose laws the parties have chosen
to govern their contract.7 The act of state doctrine is also used
in cases where the parties have not agreed on a choice of law. In
such cases, the act of state doctrine serves in effect to determine
the law applicable to the agreement.
79
The act of state doctrine only exempts public acts of foreign
sovereigns from judicial scrutiny if such acts were committed
within the territory of the sovereign. 0 Thus, U.S. courts will
only find contracts that have their situss t in a foreign country's
territory to have been affected by that country's acts of state.8 2
The determination of the situs of a contract raises a number of
problems83 and causes uncertainties.8 4 The majority of U.S.
courts have tended to locate the situs of a loan agreement in the
country that was contractually stipulated by the parties as the
place of payment and jurisdiction for the settlement of dis-
putes.8 5 According to these principles, if the situs of the loan
agreement is located outside the foreign country whose act of
state has been invoked by the debtor, for instance to justify a
77. See Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 532-38.
78. Id. at 539. The same result can be reached by application of traditional con-
flict-of-laws concepts under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See id.; RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 30, § 187(2). See also Triad Financial Establish-
ment v. Tumpane Co., 611 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (containing contract that stip-
ulated New York law, but court applied Saudi Arabian decree reflecting a fundamental
public policy, citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 187(2) (b)). See
infra note 91 for a further discussion of the Triad case.
79. See Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 542-47.
80. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 443, Reporters'
Note no. 4 (citing further authority).
81. Black's Law Dictionary defines "situs" as "the place where a thing is considered,
for example, with reference to jurisdiction over it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1387 (6th
ed. 1990).
82. See Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 542-47.
83. Id. at 543.
84. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 10, § 443, Reporters'
Note no. 4 (citing further authority). For a good discussion of the problem of locating
the situs see Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 594 (1986).
85. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 443, Reporters'
Note no. 4 (citing further authority); Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 542-
47.
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refusal to make payment, then the U.S. court will not apply the
foreign sovereign act to modify the contractual obligation.86
By invoking the act of state doctrine, foreign debtors have
successfully defended themselves against U.S. creditors on
grounds that capital export prohibitions or expropriations made
the performance of their debt obligations impossible. 7 In such
cases, the act of state doctrine allowed U.S. courts to avoid pass-
ing judgment on the foreign sovereign acts upon which a
debtor's defense rested. 8 To be sure, a court would give effect
to a foreign act of state only when a finding of liability on the
part of the debtor would cause the debtor to violate the sover-
eign act upon satisfaction of the judgment."9
The replacement of national European currencies with a
unitary European currency is a foreign act of state and a judg-
ment against a debtor for payment in an old national currency
would violate the EU currency regulations. It is thus probable
that, when one of the parties invokes the European currency
conversion to its advantage, U.S. courts will use the act of state
doctrine in order to determine to what extent it should recog-
nize that party's claim. In each of the three fact patterns out-
lined above, this could lead to the following results:
(1) Where a debtor has been sued for payment in an old
national currency, he or she will be able to invoke successfully
the official substitution of the Euro for such currency, in reli-
ance on the act of state doctrine, only if the situs of the pay-
ment obligation, as determined by the standards discussed
above, is located in an EU Member State that is participating
86. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 443, Reporters'
Note no. 4; Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 542-47, 550-54. See Trinh v.
Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that Vietnamese
decree of confiscation should not be recognized, because situs of obligation, arising
from bank deposit, no longer lay in Vietnam after closure of defendant's bank branch
in Saigon, but rather in New York, where bank had its seat). In Trinh, the court thus
decided that Citibank was not subject to Vietnamese acts of state following the closure
of its branch in Vietnam. Citing Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660
F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), the court held that, under the act of state doctrine, it was not
required to respect a Vietnamese act of state which concerned obligations whose situs
was located outside the sovereign territory of Vietnam. Trinh, 623 F. Supp. at 1536.
87. See Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 533-38.
88. See, e.g., Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir.
1971).
89. Id. See also Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra note 32, at 533-38 (citing addi-
tional cases).
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in the third stage of the EMU. If this is the case, a U.S. court
would be compelled to recognize the abolition of the old na-
tional currency and to dismiss the creditor's complaint.
Should the situs lie outside the participating EU Member
States, however, for example because the parties have chosen
New York as place of payment and forum state, the court
would not be compelled by the act of state doctrine to recog-
nize the currency conversion.
(2) For the creditor who sues for payment in Euro of an
obligation denominated in an old national currency, the situ-
ation is similar to that in (1) above. In order to establish that
the old national currency obligation has been validly trans-
formed into an obligation to pay in the new Euro currency,
the creditor must prove under the act of state doctrine that
the situs of this claim is located in a participating EU Member
State. The court would reject the debtor's claim that he or
she is in all events obligated to pay only in the old national
currency, because such a payment would violate the EU cur-
rency regulations.
(3) Where the creditor demands payment of an old na-
tional currency obligation in U.S. dollars, a different result
would arise. Even if the debtor could show that the situs of
the obligation lies in a participating EU Member State, this
defense would not be sufficient for dismissal of the complaint
because ajudgment against the debtor in U.S. dollars would
not violate the EU currency regulations. Additionally, as dis-
cussed above, it is unlikely that a U.S. court would conclude
that the payment of a debtor's obligation had become unen-
forceable simply because the contractual currency had been
replaced by another currency.
3. Public Policy
Where the parties to an agreement include a choice of law
clause, but chose the law of a state that is not a participating
Member State of the EU, such as New York law, the question
arises to what extent a U.S. court under traditional conflict-of-
laws rules could nonetheless give effect to the EU currency con-
version regulations.
To answer this question, a U.S. court would probably turn to
the solution suggested in Section 187(2) of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws." This provision sets out the ex-
90. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 30, § 187(2).
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ceptional circumstances under which the parties' choice of law
should yield to the stronger public policy of another jurisdiction.
The position taken by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws has
been widely accepted by U.S. courts."' Section 187(2) (b) pro-
vides that the state law chosen by the parties to govern their con-
tract will not be applied if such application would be contrary to
a fundamental policy of a different state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue, and which, under the rule of Section 188 of
the Restatement, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. Section 188
provides that in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties, the law of the state which, with respect to a particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and
the parties will apply to that issue.
According to Section 187(2), the law chosen by the parties
should not be applied to a specific issue if the court finds that
(i) a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction of the chosen law
has, with respect to the particular issue, the most significant rela-
tionship to the transaction and the parties, 2 (ii) the jurisdiction
with the most significant relationship has a materially greater in-
terest than the jurisdiction whose law was chosen in determining
the particular issue, and (iii) the jurisdiction with the most sig-
nificant relationship and the materially greater interest has a
91. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 30, at 665, 674; Gruson, Act of State Doctrine, supra
note 32, at 524 nn. 21-22. Triad Financial Establishment v. Trumpane Co. is a good exam-
ple of the application of Section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. Triad Financial Establishment v. Tumpane Co., 611 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y.
1985); RESrATEMENT OF CONFUCT OF LAws, supra note 30, § 187(2). 7riad involved a
suit for an agent's fees in connection with a military procurement contract. The de-
fendant principal had engaged the plaintiff agent to assist in obtaining certain service
contracts in connection with the sale of arms by the United States to Saudi Arabia. The
agency agreement stipulated New York law, but the court held that Saudi Arabia had a
materially greater interest in the controversy than New York and that a Saudi Arabian
decree prohibiting payment of agent's fees in connection with the sale of armaments
reflected a fundamental policy, namely an attempt to root out corruption and bribery
in military contracts. Tiiad, 611 F. Supp. at 162-66. The court also found that Saudi
Arabia had significant connections with the transaction and New York had very few. Jd.
at 163. The court presumably intended to show that in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties, Saudi Arabia would be the state of the applicable law.
Consequently, the court applied the Saudi Arabian decree, in spite of a valid stipulation
by the parties of New York law. The court based its decision on Restatement of Conflict
of Laws Section 187(2) (b). Id. at 162 n.3.
92. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLI(Tr OF LAWS, supra note 30, §§ 187(2)(b), 188.
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fundamental public policy that would be violated by the applica-
tion of the contractually chosen law.93 In order to determine
whether a jurisdiction other than the one chosen by the parties
has a more significant relationship to a specific issue of a given
case, the court must take into consideration the same contacts
that are significant in determining what law should govern a con-
tract in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.94
The more significant the relationship between the contract and
the country of the law chosen by the parties, the stronger the
conflicting public policy of the country whose law would apply in
the absence of an effective choice of law must be to override the
chosen law.9"
Similar to the case where no choice of law clause exists, the
court in this case would probably give effect to the EU currency
regulations pursuant to Section 187(2) of the Restatement only
if the place of performance of the loan were a participating EU
Member State.96 If this condition were met, a court would prob-
ably find that the EU Member State had a materially greater in-
terest in the regulation of the contract currency than the coun-
try whose law had been chosen by the parties, and that the appli-
cation of the chosen law would violate the public policy
underlying the EU currency regulations.
The following consequences for each of the three fact pat-
terns outlined above result from the foregoing "public policy"
analysis:
(1) Where a debtor has been sued for payment in an old
national currency, he or she will be able successfully to invoke
the substitution of the Euro for such currency in reliance on
the "public policy" exception of Section 187(2) of the Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws only if the contractual place of
payment and other contacts are located in an EU Member
State participating in the third stage of the EMU. Provided
this is the case, it is likely that the court would also regard the
other conditions of Section 187(2) as fulfilled. The court
would conclude that the EU Member State had a significant
interest in regulating the issue in dispute, that is, the regula-
93. Id., § 187(2). See Gruson, The Remedies Opinion in International Transactions, 27
INT'L LAW. 911, 923 (1993).
94. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 30, §§ 187(2) (b), 188.
95. Id. § 187 cmt. g.
96. Id. §§ 187(2) (b), 188(2)(c).
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tion of the contract currency, and that ajudgment against the
debtor for payment in the old national currency would violate
a fundamental public policy of the EU Member State.
(2) The creditor suing for payment in Euro on an obli-
gation denominated in an old national currency would like-
wise have to prove under the "public policy" exception to Sec-
tion 187(2) that the place of payment and other contacts are
located in a participating EU Member State. It is likely that
the court would then, as in (1) above, consider the other con-
ditions of Section 187(2) to have been fulfilled.
(3) The debtor who is sued for payment in U.S. dollars
on an old national currency obligation could similarly invoke
the abolition of the old national currency if the debt is to be
paid in a participating EU Member State. As explained
above, however, this will not sufficiently prove the invalidity of
a payment obligation. 97 Moreover, a judgment against the
debtor for payment in U.S. dollars would not violate any
"public policy" underlying the EU currency regulations.
D. Application of U.C.C. Section 2-614(2)
Section 2-614 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code9 8
("U.C.C.") allows the debtor under certain circumstances to pay
an obligation, denominated in a currency that may no longer be
tendered for payment owing to a foreign act of state, in the man-
ner provided for by that act of state. Article 2 of the U.C.C.,
however, applies only to contracts for the sale of goods. 99 In the
United States, foreign currency is treated essentially as a "com-
modity,"'0 0 and thus as a "good,"'1  but only when the foreign
currency does not serve as a medium of payment, that is, as con-
sideration.1 1 2 In the case of a long-term payment obligation, for
97. See supra notes 10-25 and accompanying text (discussing suits for payment in
U.S. dollars).
98. N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 2-614 (McKinney 1993).
99. Id. §§ 2-102, 2-105(1).
100. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 754 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir.
1985).
101. Richard v. American Union Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 719 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other
grounds, 205 N.Y.S. 622 (App. Div. 1924), affd, 149 N.E. 338 (N.Y. 1925); Richard v.
American Union Bank, 170 N.E. 532, 535 (N.Y. 1930).
102. N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 2-105(1) notes (McKinney 1993) (New York Annotations);
QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 2-105
[A] [5] (Supp. 1997) (noting difference between buying and selling of money as com-
modity (i.e., currency trading) and exchange of money in payment for goods or services
or in payment of loan). See Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (USA), 556 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261 n.2
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example a DM-Bond due after the year 2001, the German Mark
is merely the expression by the issuer of its duty to repay. Be-
cause there is no "sale," Article 2 of the U.C.C. cannot be ap-
plied directly.
The legal rationale for U.C.C. Section 2-614 is that a debtor
should not be freed from his or her duty to pay simply because it
is no longer possible to make payment in the currency originally
agreed to by the parties, provided a reasonable alternative form
of payment is available. By way of analogy, this rationale could
be applied by a U.S. court to contracts not governed by Article 2
of the U.C.C.
E. Contract Interpretation
A U.S. court could solve the currency conversion problem
in the three scenarios we are considering by applying substantive
contract law rather than by applying rules of conflict of laws.
The court could interpret the agreement that payment be made
in a specific currency to mean that payment be made in the cur-
rency that is legal tender at the time of performance in the coun-
try which issued the originally stipulated currency. For instance,
the term "Deutsche Mark" could be interpreted as being a short-
hand expression for "the currency of the Federal Republic of
Germany that is legal tender at the time of performance."
1. Interpretation
A court could reach this result by way of ascertaining the
meaning that it will give to the contract term "Deutsche Mark" in
determining the legal effect of the contract.1 "3 This process is
known, as "interpretation." Such interpretation would be appro-
priate if the court found the meaning of the term "Deutsche
Mark" to be ambiguous in light of the replacement of the Ger-
man currency. 104 According to one view, an objective standard
of reasonableness should always be applied to determine the
(App. Div. 1990) (holding that U.C.C. is applicable to foreign exchange transactions
because U.C.C. excludes money only when it is medium of payment, not when treated
as commodity). The nature of foreign currency as commodity was at issue in A Ltd. v. B
Bank and Bank of X, [1997] F.S.R. 165, 172-73 (Ct. App., July 31, 1996).
103. See 2 FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.7, at 237 (1990). Some
writers refer to the process of determining the legal meaning of a contract term as
.construction." Id.
104. Id. at 240.
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meaning of an ambiguous term.1" 5 The prevailing view, how-
ever, would give effect to the common meaning shared by both
parties in preference to the objective meaning.0 6 If a lender
and a borrower agreed on a loan denominated in Deutsche
Mark, and the lender had in mind payment in the currency that
would be legal tender in Germany at the time of repayment of
the loan, whereas the borrower was of the view he would be free
from the obligation of repayment if the German currency in ef-
fect at the time they entered into the contract was replaced by a
common European currency, the parties would not have had a
"meeting of the mind" on a significant issue and there would be
no contract-unless the court could tip the scales of interpreta-
tion in favor of the meaning of lender or borrower.10 7 There,
the borrower knew, or had reason to know, that a lender would
never agree to an interpretation of the repayment clause in the
loan agreement that freed the borrower from its obligation alto-
gether if the Deutsche Mark were replaced by a European cur-
rency. Thus, the loan agreement would be interpreted as having
been entered into on lender's terms. 10 8
If the parties to the agreement gave no thought to the
meaning of the word "Deutsche Mark," the court must interpret
the word applying a standard of reasonableness. In this case, the
interpretation would turn on the meaning that a reasonable per-
son in the position of the parties would have attached had they
given thought to the matter."0 9 The rules of interpretation as-
sume that an interpretation resulting in a bargain that a reason-
able person would have made will be preferred over an interpre-
tation that would result in such bargain." ° Any interpretation of
an agreement that would free a party from its obligation to pay
because a country has substituted a new currency for its old cur-
rency would be found unfair or unconscionable.'
105. Id. at 245-46 (citing additional authority); Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer,
Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
106. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 7.9, at 246-47.
107. Id at 248.
108. Id at 248-49; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS].
109. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 7.9, at 254; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Florida E.C. Ry., 399 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1968).
110. FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 7.11, at 264-65.
111. Id.
[Vol. 21:65
INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO
2. Omitted Case
The above discussion deals with the interpretation of the
word "Deutsche Mark." A court might take the view that the par-
ties to a contract stipulating Deutsche Mark as contract currency
have omitted addressing the issue of a currency conversion.' 1 2
The parties may not have foreseen the problem or may have
made a conscious decision not to deal with it, for instance, be-
cause they were confident that the law will provide reasonable
solutions for issues arising in connection with the currency sub-
stitution.' 1  It is the task of the court to supply "implied" terms
to fill the gap in the agreement. 14 This process, frequently
called implication, could be based on either the actual expecta-
tions of the parties not reduced to writing or, if the expectations
of the parties were different, the objective test of whether one
party reasonably should have known the other's expectations."'
If the court cannot find an indication of the parties' expecta-
tions, it would apply principles ofjustice to solve the situation for
which the parties did not provide.' 16 Again, an interpretation of
a contract that would free an obligor from his or her obligation
to pay because the country of the contract currency has changed
its currency would not meet standards of justice.
Courts do not always state which of these interpretative
methods they employ. For instance, in Johansen v. Confederation
Life Association," 7 the court did not state that it had engaged in
contract interpretation as such. In that case, the parties had se-
lected U.S. currency as the means of payment in contracts which
were to be performed in Cuba. Both the Cuban peso and the
U.S. dollar were legal tender in Cuba at the time the contracts
were entered into and could be used interchangeably. Given the
interchangeable nature of the two currencies, the court inter-
preted the payment clause to the effect that the parties could
pay in either currency, or, presumably, in whatever currency was
legal tender in Cuba at the time of payment." 8 Nevertheless,
112. Id. § 7.16, at 304.
113. Id. § 7.15, at 299-300.
114. Id. § 7.16, at 302-03; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 108, § 204.
115. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, §§ 7.15, at 305. 7.16, at 298-99.
116. Id. § 7.16, at 307.
117. Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971); see supra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing Johansen).
118. Johansen, 447 F.2d at 177 ("Thus, it is evident that when the policies in ques-
19971
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the court went on to examine the applicability of the 1951 and
1959 Cuban currency laws, using the conflict-of-laws analysis.
In Sternberg v. West Coast Life Insurance Co.,1 19 an action for
payment of a life insurance policy payable in California but de-
nominated in Tael, Shanghai Sycee, the court held that the
plaintiff could recover only "in the current Chinese currency de-
termined as of the date of requested payment."12' The court
concluded that the Chinese currency decrees, which altered the
value of the currency, did not apply directly by virtue of law12 '
but rather because the parties who agreed on payment in a for-
eign currency had also agreed to be subject to the currency laws
of the country of issue. 122  Thus, the court rejected the lex
monetae as a mandatory conflict-of-laws rule and reached the
same result by way of contract interpretation. 123
3. Impossibility and Impracticability of Performance
It could be argued that the substitution of the Euro for the
old national currencies will make performance of the contract
tion here stated that United States currency was to be paid, it was referring to a legal
Cuban tender which after 1939 could be paid in either dollars or pesos.").
119. Sternberg v. West Coast Life Insurance Co., 16 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961).
120. Id. at 548.
121. The court rejected the argument that the "foundation of the judgment rests
solely upon the concept that the Chinese decrees in themselves altered the value of the
currency." Id. at 550.
122. The court noted that "[w]hen parties name a specified currency for the pay-
ment of an obligation, they know that such a currency falls under the control of the
government that issues it." Id. at 54849. In addition, the court stated that the judg-
ment "relies upon the parties' inclusions in their agreements that payment be made in
Chinese currency." Id. at 550. Whether California or Chinese law governs the agree-
ment is irrelevant for this analysis. Id.
123. The court, at times, mixes the concept of the currency of payment with the
concept of the value of the stipulated currency and the date on which the value must be
determined. The court emphasized that the parties stipulating a foreign currency real-
ize that currency is subject to fluctuation. Id. at 549 (citing extensively from Deutsche
Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926)). The Court also stressed the
Chinese Government's central control over the "value of the currency" and that the
parties had accepted the "fluctuating value" of the currency. Id. at 550. Interpretation
of the meaning of a contractually stipulated currency in light of the replacement of that
currency in the country of issuance, China, was at issue in Judah v. Delaware Trust Com-
pany. Judah v. Delaware Trust Company, 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1977). In In re Lendle's
Estate, the Court interpreted a will containing a legacy in German marks to mean the
German marks in existence at the time the legacies are paid. In re Lendle's Estate, 166
N.E. 182 (N.Y. 1929). See also In re Illfelder's Estate, 240 N.Y.S. 413 (Sup. Ct. 1930)
(expanding upon interpretation of will), aff'd, 249 N.Y.S. 903 (App. Div. 1931).
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denominated in an old national currency impossible or, in to-
day's usage, impracticable. Impossibility is the inability to per-
form as promised due to intervening events, such as an act of
state or the destruction of the subject matter of the contract.124
The principles of contract construction are also used to solve
problems of impossibility125 or impracticability.1 26 Courts have
frequently rationalized an excuse from performance on grounds
of impossibility by stating that it is an "implied condition" of the
duty to perform that performance remains possible.127 Thus, in
Taylor v. Caldwell,121 the court found an "implied condition that
the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, performance
becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing" which legal
construction would fulfill the intention of the parties.1 29 In Tay-
lor, Taylor rented Caldwell's music hall for performances, but
the hall was accidentally destroyed before the first performance,
and Taylor sued Caldwell for breach of contract. Other opin-
ions have not so much read implied conditions into the contract
as they have sought to supply by way of implication a term to
govern an issue that in the court's view is not covered by the
agreement. 130 The modern view on impossibility is reflected in
the doctrine of impracticability, 13' which recognizes that justice
requires a departure from the rule that a promisor bears the risk
of increased difficulties in performance.13 2 In order for a party
to claim that a superseding event or "contingency" prevented his
or her performance under the doctrine of impracticability, he or
she must show that (i) the event must have made "performance
as agreed ... impracticable," and (ii) that nonoccurrence of the
124. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Envases Venezolanos, S.A.,
740 F. Supp. 260, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting United States v. Gen. Douglas MacAr-
thur Senior Village, Inc., 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974)).
125. FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.5; U.C.C. § 2-613 (1995).
126. FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.6.
127. Id. § 9.5, at 541.
128. Taylor v. Caldwell, 122'Eng. Rep. 309 (KB. 1863).
129. Id. at 312.
130. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.5, at 541-42; Lord Sands in Scott & Sons
v. Del Sel, [1922] Sess. Cas. 592, 596-97, affd, [1923] Sess. Cas. 37 (H.L.). The court is
supplying a term to deal with an omitted case. See supra notes 112-123 and accompany-
ing text (discussing omitted case).
131. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.6, at 542; U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 108, § 261.
132. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.6, at 543; Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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event must have been a "basic assumption on which the contract
was made. 133
It would be difficult to argue that contracts based on an old
national currency contain an implied condition that a debtor
should be excused from payment because a participating Mem-
ber State has legitimately substituted the Euro for the stipulated
old national currency. After all, the abolition of the old cur-
rency cannot be analogized to the destruction of the music hall
because the old currency will be replaced by a new currency, the
Euro. The music hall has been rebuilt simultaneously with its
destruction. The new music hall has a somewhat different
faade, but the hall is available for the musical performance.
Furthermore, the nonoccurrence of the introduction of the
Euro in substitution of the old national currency is not a basic
assumption on which the parties rely when entering into the
contract. If an obligor and an obligee agreeing on a Deutsche
Mark denominated obligation had known that the Deutsche
Mark would be replaced by the Euro, they would not have ab-
stained from entering into the agreement. They would have
agreed on performance in the new currency. The substitution
does not make performance of the payment obligation impossi-
ble. It permits performance by a substitute method. Courts
have been reluctant to excuse a party from performance where a
substitute arrangement for performance is available.' 34
Some courts have said that if an event is foreseeable, a party
who makes an unqualified promise to perform necessarily as-
sumes an obligation to perform, even if the occurrence of the
event makes performance impracticable. 13 5 In the cases under
133. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995). See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.6, at 544, 549;
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 108, Chapter 11, Introductory Note. There are
other requirements for a finding of impracticability; however, they are not relevant for
this discussion.
134. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.6, at 54849; U.C.C. § 2-614, cmt. 1
(1995).
135. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (S.D. Fla.
1975);John Soley & Sons v.Jones, 95 N.E. 94 (Mass. 1911). But see FARNSWORTH, supra
note 103, § 9.6, at 554-56 (stating that foreseeability should not be conclusive although
it is one factor suggesting that promisor assumed risk of its occurrence, and that parties
may fail to provide for risks, even though they are foreseeable, because they do not
consider it to be significant enough to make it subject of bargaining or because they
regard their bargaining position as too weak to risk broaching the subject); accord RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 108, Chapter 11, Introductory Note. If the substi-
tution of the Euro for the old national currencies would lead to unenforceability, the
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examination, the parties entering into contracts since the mid-
1960s could foresee the potential impossibility to perform in the
stipulated national currencies.'3 6 Discussions regarding a mone-
tary union had already begun in the mid-1960s, so parties to
agreements could have foreseen the consequences resulting
therefrom. The absence of a contractual provision for this event
does not imply that the parties entered into a commercial trans-
action knowing that performance would become impossible.
Rather, the parties expected their contract to be payable as a
matter of course in the new European Monetary Unit, never
doubting that the new European Monetary Unit, if introduced,
would be democratically legitimized and properly incorporated
into the existing fabric of the law) 37
4. Frustration of Contract
Frustration of purpose refers to a situation where an unfore-
seen event has occurred which, even though performance is pos-
sible, destroys the underlying reason for performing the contract
and operates to discharge a party's duty of performance.131
The doctrine of frustration of purpose 39 was first an-
nounced in the case of Krell v. Henry. 140 Henry rented rooms
from Krell on specified days to watch the coronation procession
of King Edward VII. The procession was canceled and Henry
refused to pay the balance of the rent. The Court of Appeals
held for Henry because "the coronation procession was the foun-
dation of this contract, and ... the object of the contract was
frustrated by the non-happening of the coronation.' 4 ' The doc-
foreseeing parties would not have considered this event insignificant. The foreseeing
parties probably considered the introduction of the new currency insignificant because
in their mind it did not affect enforceability; they expected performance in the new
currency.
136. Cf Transohio Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 619-
20 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing foreseeability of legislative changes).
137. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-614(2) (McKinney 1993) (stating that debtor is enti-
tied to make payment in new currency provided act of state introducing new currency is
not "discriminatory, oppressive or predatory").
138. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Envases Venezolanos, S.A.,
740 F. Supp. 260, 266 (quoting Matter of Fontana D'Oro Foods, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 528,
532 (Sup. Ct. 1983), affd as modified, 484 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div.), affjd, 482 N.E.2d
1216 (N.Y. 1985)).
139. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.7.
140. Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.).
141. Id. at 751, 754.
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trine of frustration has been generally accepted by U.S. courts,14 2
and has been incorporated into the Restatement of Contracts. 143
The Restatement requirements for the doctrine of frustration
are quite similar to those for the doctrine of impracticability of
performance, except that the event must have "substantially frus-
trated" the "principal purpose" of the party claiming frustra-
tion. 14 4 As in the case of impracticability, it must have been "a
basic assumption on which the contract was made" that the event
would not occur.'45 The frustration of purpose defense may not
be available where the event, which allegedly frustrated the pur-
pose of the contract, was clearly foreseeable. 146
Neither the claim for payment nor the obligation to pay is
frustrated if payment upon performance is made in a substitute
currency of the country of the original contract currency. As in
the case of impracticability, if an obligor and an obligee agree-
ing on a Deutsche Mark denominated obligation had known
that the Deutsche Mark would be replaced by the Euro, they
would have agreed on performance in the new currency. The
substitution does not frustrate the performance of the payment
obligation because the Euro reflects the value of the Deutsche
Mark at the time of performance. This conclusion is appropri-
ate, even if the Euro has less value against the U.S. dollar than
the Deutsche Mark. According to case law, the mere fact that
what was expected to be a profitable transaction has turned out
to be a losing one is not enough to claim frustration.'47
142. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.7, at 559.
143. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 108, § 265.
144. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.7, at 561; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS,
supra note 108, § 265.
145. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 108, § 265 and ch. 11, Introductory
Note.
146. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Envases Venezolanos, S.A.,
740 F. Supp. 260, 266 (quoting VJK Productions, Inc. v. Friedman/Meyer Productions,
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 916, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). But see FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.7
(noting that foreseeability of frustrating event does not always bar relief for frustration).
147. See Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926)
(stating that if debt in question "had been due here and the value of dollars had
dropped before suit was brought the plaintiff could recover no more dollars on that
account. A foreign debtor should be no worse off."); Bank of America Nat'l Trust and
Savings Ass'n v. Envases Venezolanos, S.A., 740 F. Supp. at 266 (quoting 407 E. 61st
Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Avenue Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37, 42 (N.Y. 1968)); Dougherty v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 193 N.E. 897, 906 (N.Y. 1934)
("Money does not keep at a uniform rate of exchange or purchasing power; with the
crises which come to all nations at some time, debts must follow the ups and downs of
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In conclusion, a New York court applying modern common
law principles would either interpret the contract clause stipulat-
ing an old national currency as contract currency to mean the
currency of the specified country that is legal tender at the time
of performance or if the court concludes that the parties have
failed to address the issue of currency substitution, it would fill
the gap with the same result by way of implication. There is no
room for non-performance on the basis of impossibility, imprac-
ticability, or frustration because it cannot be said that the non-
introduction of the Euro was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made. The introduction of the Euro does not make
performance of a contract denominated in an old national cur-
rency impracticable, nor does it frustrate the principal purpose
of that contact. This conclusion accords with the principle that
contracts should be interpreted so as to be valid and conforma-
ble to law. 148
III. CONSEQUENCES FOR ECU OBLIGATIONS
The ECU is the official unit of account of the European
Community ("EC").14 The ECU is not a currency, but rather a
basket of currencies, comprised of distinct sums of all EC curren-
cies, except for the currencies of Austria, Sweden, and Finland,
whose membership in the EC first became effective on January 1,
1995.150 Parallel to the official ECU, a "private" ECU has devel-
oped in the currency and capital markets' which serves as a
unit of account in private contracts. 152
According to Article 2 of the Art. 235 Council Regulation, 15 1
all contractual references 154 to the ECU will, effective January 1,
the money market."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 9.7, at 562 (citing further author-
ity); see also Sternberg v. West Coast Life Insurance Co.,16 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961).
148. See 3 CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CoTr, ncrs § 546 (1960).
149. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 207, 209, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 707-08.
150. The basket was finally determined by EC Regulation No. 3320/94, O.J. L
350/27 (1994). See EC Treaty, supra note 2, Art. 109 g, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 650.
151. The creation of the "private" ECU may, of course, be subject to the national
currency laws. The authorization required by Whrungsgesetz Section 3 (Currency
Act) in Germany was granted by a release of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Mitteilung Nr.
1002/90 of January 5, 1990, Bundesanzeiger no. 3 of January 5, 1990.
152. This development is described in detail in Siebelt &: Hdde, Die ECU im deut-
schen Recht, 45 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 10 (1992).
153. See Art. 235 Council Regulation, supra note 7.
154. "Contracts" are covered by the term "legal instruments." Art. 235 Council
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1999, be replaced by a reference to the Euro at an exchange rate
of one Euro to one ECU, provided that the contract defines the
ECU within the meaning of Article 109 of the EC Treaty and the
definition of EC Regulation No. 3320/94.15' Even if the parties
have not clearly defined the ECU, the art. 235 Council Regula-
tion establishes a presumption that the parties intended to refer
to the ECU within the meaning of the EC law.156 This presump-
tion was recommended by the European Commission in 1994.157
The official conversion of the ECU into the Euro at a rate of
one to one applies to private agreements denominated in ECU
in the manner discussed in Parts I and II above. The conclu-
sions reached with respect to contracts denominated in old na-
tional currencies should be applicable with respect to contracts
denominated in ECU. 158
Whether federal or state courts in the United States will ap-
ply the presumption set forth in the Art. 235 Council Regula-
tion, that all contractual references to the ECU should be pre-
sumed references to the ECU within the meaning of EC law,
even when parties have not clearly defined the ECU, depends
upon what law the parties have chosen. If the parties have cho-
sen the law of an EU Member State, 159 the courts in the United
States will apply this presumption as part of the chosen foreign
Regulation, supra note 7, Art. 1. The term is broadly defined to include all writings with
legal effect.
155. EC Regulation No. 3320/94, O.J. L 350/27 (1994).
156. This presumption may be overcome by the parties to the contract if they pro-
vide for a different contractual definition of the ECU. See Art. 235 Council Regulation,
supra note 7, art. 2, and cmts. to art. 2 of the art. 235 Council Regulation, in Council
Document COM (96) 499, supra note 7.
157. Commission Recommendation No. 94/284/EC O.J. L 121/43 (1994) [here-
inafter Recommendation of the Commission] (concerning legal treatment of ECU and
of contracts denominated in ECU in view of introduction of single European currency).
158. Even if the federal and state courts in the United States should apply the lex
monetae to questions involving currency law, the European statutes concerning the Euro
would come into play only under the circumstances described in Part II hereof. The
1:1 exchange rate of ECU into Euro, in contrast with the conversion of old national
currencies of countries participating in the EMU, is not an act of currency law because
the ECU does not constitute a real currency. Rather, the conversion of ECU into Euro
simply involves modification of the monetary standard agreed to by the parties.
159. The proposed Article 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, will be effec-
tive only in participating Member States, while the Article 235 Council Regulation,
supra note 7, is effective in all Member States of the EU. See lit. 5 of the Protocol on
certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, according to which Article 1091(4) of the EC Treaty does not apply to Great
Britain and Northern Ireland.
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law.16 ° If the parties have chosen the law of a state of the United
States, however, the courts will normally not observe this rule of
presumption because the courts would not be applying foreign
law. 161 Moreover, a statutory rule of interpretation hardly consti-
tutes a non-U.S. act of state within the meaning of the act of state
doctrine, or a fundamental public policy of the relevant EU
Member State, which could be offended by the application of
the stipulated law. Neither of those doctrines, therefore, could
be relied upon to support the application of the rule of pre-
sumption. Courts in the United States would apply the general
common law rules of contractual interpretation to determine
whether the parties to a contract denominated in ECU intended
to use ECU in the sense of EC law or in the sense of a contrac-
tual unit of account.
162
The question thus becomes whether a New York court, in
applying general substantive law principles of interpretation,
would reach the same conclusion as the Proposed EC Regulation
on some provisions relating to the introduction of the Euro, and
employ a rebuttable presumption that in case of doubt the "offi-
cial" ECU was intended. This question cannot be answered with
certainty. In favor of the foregoing presumption, it could be ar-
gued that, at least after the Maastricht Treaty, entered into on
February 7, 1992, became effective on January 1, 1993,163 it was
incumbent upon the parties explicitly to define the ECU' 64 if
they wished to divorce themselves from the definition of the
ECU formulated in EC law, and thus from the mandatory con-
version of the ECU into an independent currency. On the other
hand, one could argue, the issuer of an ECU-bond or lender of
an ECU denominated loan chose precisely to denominate the
obligation in a portfolio of more or less stable currencies and,
moreover, negotiated the terms of the bond or loan on that ba-
sis. 1 65 In sum, however, the arguments appear to weigh in favor
160. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text (discussing obligations governed
by laws of country of foreign currency).
161. See supra notes 56-102 and accompanying text (addressing obligations gov-
erned by New York law).
162. See supra notes 103-148 and accompanying text (regarding contract interpre-
tation).
163. See supra note 2 (discussing EMU provisions of EC Treaty).
164. The Commission stated this position as early as April 1994. See Recommenda-
tion of the Commission, supra note 157, at no. 5.
165. See Fischer & Klanten, supra note 5, at 8 (setting forth that Euro, compiled
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of the presumption suggested by the Art. 235 Council Regula-
tion. In light of the Maastricht Treaty, a federal or state court in
the United States would be more likely than not to construe a
contractual reference to the ECU as a reference to ECU in the
meaning of EC law, provided that the contract was concluded
after the Maastricht Treaty became effective and that the parties
had not agreed otherwise. With respect to contracts concluded
before the Maastricht Treaty went into effect, the parties' inten-
tion cannot be interpreted in the same way.
IV. CLA USES IN NEW CONTRACTS
The question arises whether parties now entering into a
contract governed by New York law and having as a contract cur-
rency a currency of an EU Member State likely to participate in
the third stage of the EMU should address in the contract the
issue of currency substitution. Any attempt to address in the
contract the introduction of the Euro and the substitution of the
Euro for the old national currencies faces the potential conflict
between the contractual provisions on one hand and the Coun-
cil Regulations' 66 and the relevant national law of the Member
State on the other. The contractual provisions may violate
mandatory law, or if they do not, there may be confusion caused
by discrepancies between the contractual provisions on the one
hand, and European or national laws, rules, or even market
practices regarding the introduction of the Euro on the other.
Even a clause providing that the contract currency should be re-
placed by the Euro if the country of the contract currency partic-
ipates in the third stage of the EMU creates an ambiguity be-
cause the meaning of such a clause during the transitional pe-
riod is not clear. It could be read as requiring that all payments
during the transitional period must be made in the Euro only.
The introduction of the Euro raises two particular issues for
debt obligations denominated in the currency of an EU Member
State likely to participate in the third stage of the EMU and gov-
erned by New York law. The first issue is redenomination. At a
certain date the obligations will be deemed to be denominated
in Euro converted as provided by the above Council Regulations
from hard currencies, could, in contrast to ECU basket, quickly develop stronger mar-
ket value in relation to other currencies).
166. See supra note 7 (discussing EC Council Regulations).
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and payment on the obligations will have to be made as provided
by such Council Regulations. The second issue is the issue of
renominalization, that is, the change of the nominal amount of
the obligations expressed in amounts of the old national cur-
rency into amounts of Euros, or cents (the subdivision of the
Euro). If the nominal amount of the obligations is changed into
full Euros, fractional amounts will have to be paid to the holders.
The issuer would wish that neither redenomination nor re-
nominalization requires consent of the holders of the debt obli-
gations. Whereas the redenomination is covered by the pro-
posed Council Regulation on the introduction of the Euro, 67
the renominalization will be covered by the national law of the
EU Member States. 16 8
Parties to a contract governed by New York law would be
well advised, with respect to the introduction of the Euro, to rely
on the relevant EU regulations and the law of the Member State
of the contract currency. In doing so, they would be subject to
the same legal regime as most other obligors who owe perform-
ance in the contract currency. To accomplish this result, the
parties would have to agree on a dual or split governing law
clause, with New York law governing the contract in general, and
the European Council Regulations and the law of the country of
the contract currency governing the issues relating to the intro-
duction of the Euro and the replacement of the contract cur-
rency by the Euro. New York conflict-of-laws rules permit con-
tract parties to agree that different laws apply to different issues
or parts of their contract ("ddpe~age") .169 New York General Obli-
167. Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, Art. 6(2).
168. See proposed German law regarding the conversion of debt obligations to the
euro (Gesetz zur Umstellung von Schuldverschreibungen auf Euro), Draft of Sept. 24, 1997.
The national law is authorized by Article 8(4) of the Article 109j (4) Council Regulation,
supra note 7. See also Bartels, Umstellung verbriefter Atschuldner auf Euro, 51 Zeitschrift fur
Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht, WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 1313 (1997).
169. Gruson, Contractual Choice of Law and Choice of Forum: Unresolved Issues, in JuDi-
CIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 13-18 (Sassoon & Bradlow,
eds., 1987). See, e.g., Chinchilla v. Foreign Tankship Corp., 91 N.Y.S.2d 213, 217-18
(Sup. Ct. 1949), modified on other grounds, 97 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 102
N.Y.S.2d 438 (App. Div. 1951); Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. 1980) (noting
that agreement provided that it should be "governed by and construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware as to matters governed by the General
Corporation Law of that State."); Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 285 N.Y.S. 478 (App. Div.
1936), affd, 9 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1937). See also Corporaci6n Venezolana de Fomento v.
Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub. nom. Corporaci6n
Venezolana de Fomento v. Merban Corp., 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
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gations Law Section 5-1401 expressly provides for contractual
d~pe ,age by permitting the parties to an agreement to agree on
New York law to "govern their rights and duties in whole or in
part". 7 ° A split governing-law clause could read as follows:
The Notes shall be governed by, and construed in accordance
with, the law of the State of New York, except that if the Re-
public of France participates in the third stage of the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union, payment under, and
redenomination and renominalization of the Notes shall be
subject to the applicable regulations of the European Coun-
cil, French law and regulations, and monetary authority and
stock exchange and international clearing system regulations
and requirements.
If the notes are issued under an indenture which provides
for amendments with the consent of a certain majority of the
noteholders, the requirement for such consent should be ex-
cluded to the extent that such amendments serve to facilitate the
exchange, redenomination and renominalization of the French
Franc-denominated notes for Euro-denominated notes. More
generally, the notes may provide that the issuer (and the trust-
ees) may take any action in connection with the introduction of
the Euro that is in compliance with the laws, regulations, and
requirements referred to in the governing law clause without the
consent of any holder of the notes.
V. NEW YORK STATUTE ON THE EURO
As pointed out in this Article, although the introduction of
the Euro will not frustrate contracts denominated in old na-
tional currencies which have been replaced by the Euro, or
make the performance of such contracts impossible, 7' New
York's legislative assembly has adopted a statutory amendment to
the General Obligations Law ("Title 16") dealing with the intro-
duction of the Euro. 1 7 2
The principal purpose of Title 16 is to deal with the issue of
continuity of contracts. Section 5-1602 (1) (a) provides:
170. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989).
171. See supra notes 103-148 and accompanying text (discussing contract interpre-
tation).
172. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1601 to 5-1604 (McKinney Supp. 1997). The New
York Legislature added a new title 16 to the New York General Obligations Law. Simi-
lar legislative initiatives are being made in Illinois and California.
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If a subject or medium of payment of a contract, security or
instrument is a currency that has been substituted or replaced
by the euro, the euro will be a commercially reasonable sub-
stitute and substantial equivalent that may be either: (i) used
in determining the value of such currency; or (ii) tendered,
in each case at the conversion rate specified in, and otherwise
calculated in accordance with, the regulations adopted by the
council of the European Union.
Section 5-1602 (1) (a), clause (i) of Title 16 provides that if the
Deutsche Mark is contract currency, its value can only be deter-
mined by reference to the Euro. This clause deals with the case
where an action is brought in U.S. dollars, raising the question
of how the old national currency, the contract currency, should
be valued against the U.S. dollars. 73 According to Title 16, the
Euro conversion rate set by the European Council is the only
basis for such valuation even if a different market rate for the old
national currency develops outside of Europe.17 4 Thus, Title 16
overrules case law that prefers the true market rate over the
fixed exchange rate.'75 The rationale for this change of estab-
lished case law is unclear. The case law on the valuation of for-
eign currency obligations for the purpose of awarding dollar
judgment does not interfere with the continuity of contracts or
the orderly introduction of the Euro. It is questionable whether
this change in the law serves the aim of making the creditor
whole and to avoid rewarding the debtor.17 6 The proposed
adoption of the fixed exchange rate for judgments makes it un-
necessary for the courts to select a date for the conversion.
It appears curious that Title 16 declares the Euro to be a
"commercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent"
of the replaced old national currency. This language was pre-
sumably used to paraphrase U.C.C. Section 2-614. However, the
Euro is the substitute of the replaced old national currencies,
173. See supra notes 10-25 and accompanying text (addressing suits for payment in
U.S. dollars).
174. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
market rate for old national currencies that is not linked to fixed Euro exchange rate).
175. See supra notes 23-24 (citing specific examples of such cases).
176. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 10, § 823(2) ("If, in
a case arising out of a foreign currency obligation, the court givesjudgement in dollars,
the conversion from foreign currency to dollars is to be made at such rate as to make
the creditor whole and to avoid rewarding a debtor who has delayed in carrying out the
obligation.").
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even during the transitional period.17 v As such, it would have
been preferable, and would have sounded less condescending
for European ears, if Title 16 had read " [i] f a subject or medium
of payment of a contract, security or instrument is a currency
that has been substituted or replaced by the euro, the euro may
be either:. . ." This language would not have negatively affected
the application of Section 2-614 of the U.C.C.
Section 5-1602 (1) (a), clause (ii) of Title 16 presumably ap-
plies to the transitional period and the period thereafter, be-
cause even during the transitional period the Euro has already
replaced the old national currencies. 78  This Section provides
that the borrower may tender Euros in performance of his or
her obligations. Thus, this Section makes it necessary for New
York banks to be ready to accept Euros during the transitional
period. European banks have the option to credit an amount
received in an old national currency or in Euro "to the account
of the creditor in the denomination of his account"'179 without
having to ask for the consent of the creditor. Under Title 16,
New York banks do not have this right of crediting flexibility.
Title 16 does not clearly express the principle of "no compul-
sion," meaning that during the transitional period the currency
unit that is stipulated in the relevant instrument shall be
respected and can be used in performance.'8 0 Arguably, the no-
compulsion principle follows from the statutory words that the
Euro "may be" used and from Section 5-1602(1) (c) of Title 16,
discussed below. Section 5-1602 (1) (a), clause (ii), if applied af-
ter the transitional period, does not seem to give the creditor of
an obligation denominated in an old national currency the right
to request performance in Euros in lieu of the old national cur-
rency."8 " It only speaks about the right of performance by the
debtor.
Title 16 adopts the rules on the conversion of the ECU from
the Council Regulation on certain provisions relating to the in-
177. See supra note 18 (stating that old national currencies will no longer be cur-
rencies but will be another form of expressing Euro currency).
178. Id.
179. Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, art. 8(3).
180. Id. art. 8(1).
181. The right of the creditor to demand payment in Euro follows for the time
after the transitional period from Article 14 of the Article 109j (4) Council Regulation,
supra note 7. During the transitional period the debtor has the right to choose between
performance in the Euro or in the old national currency. Id. Art. 8(3).
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troduction of the Euro.18 2 Section 5-1602 (1) (b) of Title 16 pro-
vides:
If a subject or medium of payment of a contract, security or
instrument is the ECU, the euro will be a commercially rea-
sonable substitute and substantial equivalent that may be
either: (i) used in determining the value of the ECU; or (ii)
tendered, in each case at the conversion rate specified in, and
otherwise calculated in accordance with, the regulations
adopted by the Council of the European Union.
Section 5-1601(3) of Title 16 establishes the one to one
ECU-Euro conversion and the presumption that references to
the ECU which are not defined in terms of Council Regulation
3320/94 are nevertheless references to the official ECU and are
subject to the one to one conversion unless the parties prove a
contrary intention.183 It is unfortunate that the New York legisla-
ture will adopt the politically motivated, but not economically
justifiable, presumption in favor of a one to one conversion in
the context of private contracts which do not specifically refer to
the official ECU.
Section 5-1602(1) (c) of Title 16 provides:
Performance of any of the obligations described in paragraph
(a) or (b) of this subdivision may be made in the currency or
currencies originally designated in such contract, security or
instrument (so long as such currency or currencies remain
legal tender) or in euro, but not in any other currency,
whether or not such other currency (i) has been substituted
or replaced by the euro or (ii) is a currency that is considered
182. Art. 235 Council Regulation, supra note 7, Art. 2. See supra notes 149-165 and
accompanying text (examining consequences for ECU obligations).
183. Section 5-1601 (3) of Title 16 provides:
"ECU" or "European Currency Unit" shall mean the currency basket that is
from time to time used as the unit of account of the European Community as
defined in European Council Regulation No. 3320/94. When the euro first
becomes the monetary unit of participating member states of the European
Union, references to the ECU in a contract, security or instrument that also
refers to such definition of the ECU shall be replaced by references to the
euro at a rate of one euro to one ECU. References to the ECU in a contract,
security or instrument without such a definition of the ECU shall be pre-
sumed, unless either demonstrated or proven to the contrary by the intention
of the parties, to be references to the currency basket that is from time to time
used as the unit of account of the European Community.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601(3) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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a denomination of the euro and has a fixed conversion rate
with respect to the euro.
The first half of this Section sets forth the "no compulsion"
and the "no prohibition" rule.1 ' 4 However, Section 1602(1) (c)
is correctly limited to the transitional period. This follows from
the qualification of the right to pay in the old national currency
"so long as such currency or currencies remain legal tender."
The second half of Section 5-1602(1) (c) seems to say that a
Deutsche Mark debt cannot be paid in French Franc. It is not
obvious why such provision is necessary or desirable, because
both the Deutsch Mark and the French Frank have a fixed ex-
change rate against the Euro. However, the provision mirrors a
similar provision in the Council Regulation on the introduction
of the Euro.18 5
Section 5-1602(2) of Title 16186 provides that the introduc-
tion of the Euro does not trigger the application of doctrines
such as frustration and impossibility, which have the effect of dis-
charging or excusing performance. The continuity clause, how-
ever, contains in clause (d) a condition that may turn it into a
discontinuity clause: A calculation or determination with refer-
ence to an interest rate formula after the introduction of the
Euro does not have the effect of discharging or excusing per-
184. 84 See Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, art. 8. Article 8(1) of
the Article 109j(4) Council Regulation ensures that during the transitional period a
party to a contract will only have to use the unit, either euro or old national currency, to
which the parties have agreed, and Article 8(3) gives the debtor the choice of paying his
or her debt in the euro unit or the old national currency unit.
185. Article 8(3) of the Article 109j (4) Council Regulation, supra note 7, provides
that any amount denominated either in the Euro unit or in the national currency unit
of a given participating Member State, "and payable within that Member State by credit-
ing an account of the creditor," can be paid by the debtor either in the euro unit or in
that national currency unit.
186. Section 5-1602(2) of Title 16 provides:
None of: (a) the introduction of the euro; (b) the tendering of euros in con-
nection with any obligation in compliance with paragraph (a) or (b) of subdi-
vision one of this section; (c) the determining of the value of any obligation in
compliance with paragraph (a) or (b) of subdivision one of this section; or (d)
the calculating or determining of the subject or medium of payment of a con-
tract, security or instrument with reference to interest rate or other basis
[that?] has been substituted or replaced due to the introduction of the euro
and that is a commercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent,
shall either have the effect of discharging or excusing performance under any
contract, security or instrument, or give a party the right to unilaterally alter or
terminate any contract, security or instrument.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1602(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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formance only if such calculation or determination is a "com-
mercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent." Sec-
tion 5-1602(2) (d) of Title 16 differs substantially from the Coun-
cil Regulation 18 7  on certain provisions relating to the
introduction of the Euro which does not contain such condition
for continuity of contracts. In the case of each floating rate loan
denominated in the currency of a Member State of the EU par-
ticipating in the third stage of the EMU, this provision requires
proof that the substituted Euro interest rate formula is a reason-
able substitute and substantial equivalent of the old formula.
In the same manner as the Council Regulation on certain
provisions relating to the introduction of the Euro, 88 Section 5-
1603 of Title 16 confirms the generally accepted principle of
freedom of contract.
1 8 9
In light of New York's substantive law on contracts, the
adoption of Title 16 is not necessary. In addition, Title 16 raises
three general issues. At times of political and social upheaval,
countries tend to replace their currencies frequently. Some of
the cases discussed in this Article 9 ° give a good picture of daisy
chains of currency substitutions. If the introduction of the Euro
requires a statute in order to preserve the continuity of con-
tracts, a similar statute would be required every time a country's
currency is replaced by another. Title 16 attempts to address
this concern with a most curious provision which tries to instruct
future legislators not to follow the example of Title 16, and
courts not to pay attention to Title 16 when faced with other
currency substitutions. Section 5-1604(2) of Title 16 provides:
In circumstances of currency alteration, other than the intro-
duction of the euro, the provisions of this title shall not be
interpreted as creating a negative inference or negative pre-
187. See Art. 235 Council Regulation, supra note 7, art. 3.
188. Id.
189. Section 5-1603 of Title 16 provides: "The provisions of this title shall not alter
or impair and shall be subject to any agreement between the parties with specific refer-
ence to or agreement regarding the introduction of the euro." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-1603 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
190. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 193
N.E. 897, 904-06 (N.Y. 1934) (addressing Russian currency); Johansen v. Confederation
Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1971) (regarding Cuban currency); Sternberg
v. West Coast Life Insurance Co., 16 Cal. Rptr. 546, 547-50 (1961) (discussing Chinese
currency); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526,1538 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (concern-
ing Vietnamese currency), aff'd, 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
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sumption regarding the validity or enforceability of contracts,
securities or instruments denominated in whole or in part in
a currency affected by such alteration.
In other words, Title 16 states that it is really not necessary to
enact that statute. It is an open question whether this unusual
instruction will influence the courts. Section 5-1604(2) is contra-
dictory to the act of adopting Title 16 and must be characterized
by the old Roman legal maxim of "venire contra factum
proprium."9 1
New York's legislative initiative creates a second problem by
raising serious doubts about the enforcement of obligations de-
nominated in old national currencies and governed by the law of
a state which has not adopted a similar statute.
Lastly, the differences between Title 16 and the Council
Regulations 19 2 will raise troublesome questions. The drafters of
Title 16 will claim that they did not attempt to duplicate the
Council Regulations but that they only intended to regulate the
issue of continuity of contracts. Because Title 16 adopts many
but not all provisions of the Council Regulations, however, it will
be difficult later to maintain this argument. A party before a
New York court will find it difficult to persuade the court that
Title 16 did not attempt to regulate all issues relating to the in-
troduction of the Euro. Furthermore, there are significant dif-
ferences between Title 16 and the Council Regulations, includ-
ing Title 16's requirements that interest rate calculations must
be a "commercially reasonable substitute and substantial
equivalent. 11 3
Predictability and certainty would have been better served if
New York had simply adopted those provisions of the Council
Regulations, which deal with issues of contract law and expressly
recognized those provisions that deal with issues of monetary
law. New York could also have passed a law recognizing the con-
191. Venire contrafactum praprium nemini licet. A party may not claim a legal inter-
pretation which is contradicted by its own acts. See DiG. 1, 7, 25 (Ulpian); Azo, BRO-
CARmDICA SrvE GENERALIAJURIS (ed. Basel 1567); LIEBS, LATEINISCHE RECHTSREGELN UND
RECHTSSPRICHWORTER 217 (5th ed. 1991); DETrE, VENIRE CoNTRA FACTUM PROPRIUM
NULLI CONCEDITUR (1985).
192. See Art. 235 Council Regulation and Art. 109j(4) Council Regulation, supra
note 7.
193. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1602(2)(d). (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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flict-of-laws rule referred to as lex monetae.1°4 Neither approach
may have been politically feasible. The next best course of ac-
tion would have been to rely on the quality and ability of the
judges of the State of New York and the Second Circuit. New
York's and the Second Circuit's decisions demonstrate that such
reliance is not unreasonable. In particular, New York's judges
have frequently emphasized awareness of their responsibility to
New York's role as an international financial and commercial
center.19 5
CONCLUSION
A New York court will, in all likelihood, interpret an agree-
ment to make payment in an old national currency of a EU
Member State participating in the third stage of the European
Economic Monetary Union as an agreement to make payment in
the currency that constitutes legal tender at the time of perform-
ance. With respect to bonds or loans denominated in ECU, one
should assume that parties who entered into a contract after the
EC Maastricht Treaty had taken effect intended, in referring to
the ECU, to call upon the meaning thereof in EC law, unless
they explicitly defined the ECU in different terms. In all events,
a creditor can minimize the existing uncertainties by presenting
his or her claim to the U.S. court as a suit for payment in U.S.
dollars or by suing the debtor before the courts of an EU Mem-
ber State, provided the chosen tribunal has the requisite jurisdic-
tion to hear his or her claim.
194. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (examining lex monetae).
195. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United Missouri Bank, N.A., 643
N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 (App. Div. 1996); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 404
N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y. 1980);J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333
N.E.2d 168, 172-73 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Pallavicini v. Int'l Tel. and
Tel. Corp., 341 N.Y.S.2d 281 (App. Div. 1973), afj'd, 316 N.E.2d 722 (N.Y. 1974); Inter-
continental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576, 582-83 (N.Y. 1969).
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